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TORTS: CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY IN CASES OF
ABSOLUTE STATUTORY LIABILITY-IN SEARCH
OF THE MINNESOTA RULE
[Zerby v. Warren, - Minn. __, 210 N.W.2d 58 (1973)].
I. INTRODUCTION
Civil liability arising out of the violation of a criminal statute is ordinarily
grounded in negligence. Unless the legislature explicitly so provides, a crim-
inal statute does not create tort liability,' although it does establish a duty
which each individual owes to society. 2 The courts interpret these statutory
duties to run to each person in the class which the legislature intended to
protect, and, thus, adopt them, in addition to the general common law duty to
exercise due care, as standards for judging whether injurious conduct is
tortious. 3 Since negligence consists of the breach of a legal duty, violation of
a statute imposing such a duty is negligence, not mere evidence of negligence.'
Except for the nature and source of the defendant's duty, then, an action
based upon violation of a statute is much like any other negligence case.'
In rare instances, however, the courts will construe a criminal statute as
creating an absolute duty, the violation of which will give rise to strict
liability.' Strong public policy considerations underlie these decisions. The
statute in question is always one which protects the public health or safety,7
and in addition, it typically is designed to protect the members of a limited
class against their own inability to protect themselves.' Although the courts
occasionally do so,9 it is technically inaccurate to speak of liability arising
1. W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 191 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
2. Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 104, 41 N.W. 543, 543 (1889). The Minnesota Su-
preme Court in Osborne held liable in negligence a drug store owner whose clerk breached a
statute prohibiting sale of poison without a "poison" label. Said the court:
Negligence is the breach of legal duty. It is immaterial whether the duty is one
imposed by the rule of common law ... or is imposed by a statute designed for the pro-
tection of others. In either case the failure to perform the duty constitutes negligence,
and renders the party liable for injuries resulting from it. The only difference is that in
the one case the measure of legal duty is to be determined upon common-law principles,
while in the other the statute fixes it, so that the violation of the statute constitutes
conclusive evidence of negligence or, in other words, negligence per se. 40 Minn. at 105,
41 N.W. at 543-44.
3. Id. at 104,41 N.W. at 543.
4. Id. at 105, 41 N.W. at 544. See quotation set forth in note 2 supra.
5. Id. at 105,41 N.W. at 544.
6. Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526,536, 27 N.W.2d 555, 560 (1947).
7. Id. at 535, 27 N.W.2d at 560.
8. Id.
9. PROSSER § 36, at 197.
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out of violations of these exceptional statutes as "negligence per se."' 0 In-
stead, it is a special breed of strict statutory liability, differing from most
others. Because of the seriousness of the evil to be protected against, or be-
cause the plaintiff is a person to be protected from his own inability to care
for himself, contributory negligence and assumption of risk will not relieve
the defendant of liability." Consequently, some courts and commentators
avoid the use of the term "strict liability," applying the appellation "absolute
liability," instead. 2
Though "absolute liability" is something of a misnomer, 3 the Minnesota
Supreme Court, in a recent decision, applied the phrase literally, refusing to
grant contribution to or enforce a contract of indemnity in favor of a de-
fendant who had violated one of these exceptional statutes. Zerby v. War-
ren 4 was an action brought by a trustee for the wrongful death of his
minor son. The defendant sold toxic glue to decedent's companion who, in
turn, gave the glue to the decedent to inhale. Named as third-party de-
fendants were the companion and the manufacturer of the glue. The supreme
court affirmed the trial court's decision that only the defendant retailer was
liable.
The unique factual setting of Zerby offers an excellent framework for an
analysis of the role of contribution and indemnity in tort actions involving
violation of a criminal statute. Decedent, Steven Zerby, 14, and Randy
Rieken, 13, purchased two pint cans of"Weldwood" glue, containing toluene,
an aromatic hydrocarbon solvent in defendant Warren's Coast-to-Coast
Store. The two boys then inhaled the fumes of the glue. Zerby suffered injury
to his central nervous system causing him to fall into a creek and drown.
Warren had purchased the glue from United States Plywood through Coast-
to-Coast Central Organization, Inc., on whose purchase order form appeared
a provision indemnifying the buyer against all liability consequent to the sale
of the glue. Warren was held liable in the lower court on the theory that his
violation of a glue sales-abuse statute 5 made him absolutely liable. On appeal,
10. Id.
II. Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 535, 27 N.W.2d 555, 560 (1947); Dusha v. Virginia
& Rainy Lake Co., 145 Minn. 171, 174, 176 N.W. 482, 483 (1920); PROSSER § 36, at 201; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A, comment c (1965).
12. Zerby v. Warren,_ Minn__ 210 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1973).
13. The term "absolute liability" would seem to ignore questions of proximate and con-
current causation, yet it is usually used merely to describe situations where assumption of risk
and contributory negligence are unavailable as defenses. Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526.,
535-36, 27 N.W.2d 555, 560 (1947); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 430, comment e, 431,
comment e (1965).
14. __ Minn.__, 210 N.W.2d 58 (1973).
15. MINN. STAT. § 145.38 (1971):
Subdivision 1. No person shall sell to a person under 19 years of age any glue or
cement containing toluene, benzene, zylene, or other aromatic hydrocarbon solvents, or
any similar substance which the state board of health has ... declared to have potential
for abuse and toxic effects on the central nervous system. This section does not apply
if the glue or cement is contained in a packaged kit for the construction of a model
[Vol. I
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he did not dispute his liability but claimed that Zerby's own actions, including
violation of a glue possession-abuse statute," constituted assumption of risk
and contributory negligence; that he was entitled to contribution from the
negligent companion, Rieken, who had violated both subdivisions of the
possession-abuse statute by buying and giving the glue to Zerby; and that the
contract of indemnity with United States Plywood should be enforced as
written .
7
The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the trial court rejecting each
of Warren's claims. The sales-abuse statute makes it a misdemeanor to sell
certain toxic glues to persons under 19,11 and the court held that Warren's
violation of this statutory duty of care constituted negligence per se. 0 Fur-
ther, since the statute was intended to protect a limited class of persons from
their inability to protect themselves,'" the court held that Warren's liability
was "absolute," 2' precluding the defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk. 22 The court also dismissed Warren's claim of contribution
from Rieken, characterizing the latter's actions as not "superseding" or
"substantial" causes, but mere "reaction" to the wrongful sale .2 1 Finally, the
court rejected Warren's claim of contractual indemnity because "any agree-
ment which relieves the defendants of the consequences of the violation of the
public duty imposed by [Minn. Stat.] Sec. 145.38 [1971] is against public
automobile, airplane, or similar item.
Subd. 2. No person shall openly display for sale any item prohibited in subdivision I.
16. Id. § 145.39:
Subdivision I. No person under 19 years of age shall use or possess any glue, cement or
any other substance containing toluene, benzene, zylene, or other aromatic hydrocarbon
solvents, or any similar substance which the state board of health has ... declared to
have potential for abuse and toxic effects on the the central nervous system with the
intent of inducing intoxication, excitement or stupefaction of the central nervous
system, except under the direction and supervision of a medical doctor.
Subd. 2. No person shall intentionally aid another in violation of subdivision 1.
17. - Minn. at__ , 210 N.W.2d at60.
18. MINN. STAT.§ 145.38, subd. I (1971).
19. __ Minn. at -, 210 N.W.2d at 62.
20. Id.
21. Id., citing Dusha v. Virginia & Rainy Lake Co., 145 Minn. 171, 176 N.W. 482 (1920),
and quoting Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555 (1947), and also citing RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483, comment c (1965), and PROSSER § 36, at 201, § 65, at 425,
§ 68, at 435-36.
22. __ Minn. at __ , 210 N.W.2d at 62. See, e.g., Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn.
526, 27 N.W.2d 555 (1947); Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119
N.W. 428 (1909). Accord, Doherty v. S.S. Kresge Co., 227 Wis. 661, 278 N.W. 437 (1938)
(applying Minnesota law). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 483 (1965) is also in accord:
"The plaintiff's contributory negligence bars his recovery for the negligence of the defendant
consisting of the violation of a statute, unless the effect of the statute is to place the entire
responsibility for such harm as has occurred upon the defendant." Note, however, that the term
"absolute liability" may be somewhat unfortunate, as it connotes complete responsibility
regardless of cross claims. Only the defenses relating to the plaintiffs own negligence are
specifically countenanced by the above authorities, however.
23. - Minn. at -,210 N.W.2d at 64.
3
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policy.'' 2'
Though the Zerby court's threshhold findings of negligence per se and ab-
solute liability have the forces of authority 5 and logic26 behind them, this note
will argue that the desultory rejection of contribution and summary denial of
contractual indemnity pose issues of factual analysis and public policy worthy
of consideration. A review of actual and proximate causation will show that
the court's "reaction" characterization is at least questionable: an inspection
of the cases cited by the court in support of its holding that Rieken's actions
were not independent will reveal that its conclusion is groundless, and the pub-
lic policy considerations underlying the long history of contribution liability
among concurrent tortfeasors in Minnesota indicate that no legislative pur-
pose would have been undermined by allowing contribution. Similarly, the
court's refusal to enforce the indemnity contract, unsupported by citation of
authority or specific reasons, 27 is contrary to the weight of authority which
would uphold such contracts unless they induce or have as their consideration
the performance of criminal or illegal acts. Similar contractual indemnities,
such as liquor liability insurance may be endangered by the Zerbv holding,
despite the fact that the public policy arguments for forbidding them are
opposed by equally strong arguments in their favor.
II. REJECTION OF THE CONTRIBUTION CLAIM
The right of contribution arises out of separate acts creating common
liability,'2 regardless of whether the wrongdoers act in concert.2 1 When one
tortfeasor has been held liable for damage caused by many, contribution
spreads the loss among those responsible and promotes justice.' The critical
point is that the party from whom contribution is sought must have concurred
in causing the injury." Thus Warren should have been granted contribution
upon a showing of the elements necessary to establish Zerbv's cause of action
against Rieken.
On the surface, that appears a simple burden to meet. It would seem that
Rieken had a duty not to injure Zerby by giving him toxic glue, that he
breached that duty, and that his breach was a proximate cause of Zerbv's
death. First, it is necessary to establish that Rieken did have a duty to re-
24. Id.
25. See authorities cited note 22 supra.
26. Since the statute is designed to protect the plaintiff from his inability to protect himself.
it should follow% that his negligence wNould not bar his recover.
27. __ Minn. at __ .210 N.W.2d at 64.
28. PROSSER § S0.
29. *'Contribution *rests on common liability. not on joint negligence or joint tort. Common
liability exists \%hen to or more actors are liable to an injured party for the same danages. even
though their liability may rest on different grounds." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Village of Hewitt.
274 Minn. 246. 249. 143 N.\V.2d 230. 233 (1966).
30. PROSSER § 50. at 307.
31. Mathewss v. Mills. 288 Minn. 16. 178 N.W.2d 841 (1970). See PROSSER § 50.
[Vol. I
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frain from giving Zerby glue to inhale.:" Recognizing the known, grave risks
of glue-sniffing, the deterrent effect of liability, and the strong moral impera-
tives involved, the Minnesota Legislature imposed a statutory duty of care. It
is a misdemeanor for a minor to possess glues of certain types with the in-
tention of inhaling them to become intoxicated and for any person to aid
minors in achieving that illegal end. :':' There appears to be no reason why that
statute should not serve as a civil standard of conduct,just as the sales-abuse
statute does." Surely, the harm complained of was within the scope of the evil
which the statute was enacted to prevent.1 The legislative purpose underlying
both statutes is to protect against "the potential harm which could result to
minors from the sniffing of glue.""5 In the words of the Zerby court, "the duty
imposed by statute is fixed, so its breach ordinarily constitutes conclusive
evidence of negligence, or negligence per se .... :17 By the court's own logic
and authority, then, Rieken's statutory violation constitutes negligence
per se. :1
While it seems proper that Rieken's own minority be taken into con-
sideration in determining whether Rieken breached the statutory duty,1" his
age is certainly not a complete defense. While the statute establishing the
duty makes possession of potentially harmful glue by any "person under 19
years of age" a misdemeanor,"' the subdivision of the statute prohibiting aid-
ing a minor to possess contains no age limit." Thus, the court would be justi-
fied in looking to the standard of conduct of a child of the defendant's "age,
intelligence, and experience."4 2 Unfortunately, the court failed to analyze
Rieken's conduct in terms of either the statutory or the common law stand-
32. Since Rieken purchased glue and gave it to Zerby to sniff, the test to be applied is
whether the boys "[stood] in such relationship that the law will impose on [Rieken] a re-
sponsibility for the exercise of care toward [Zerby]." Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist.,
Cal. App. 2d 1,5, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847,851 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
33. MINN. STAT. § 145.39 (1971).
34. The Zerby court specifically held that the sales-abuse statute creates such a standard.
__ Minn. at__ , 210 N.W.2d at 62.
35. A statute will establish tort duty toward a particular person if its purpose is:
to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and to
protect the particular interest which is invaded, and to protect that interest against the
kind of harm which has resulted, and to protect that interest against the particular
hazard from which the harm results. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
36. Zerby v. Warren,_ Minn_ . 210 N.W.2d 58,61.
37. See id. at_ , 210 N.W.2d at62 (analysis of negligence per se).
38. Id. at , 210 N.W.2d at 64.
39. In fact, the court said, "[lit should not be forgotten ... that Rieken ... was also a mem-
ber of a limited class of persons that the legislature intended to protect from their inexperi-
ence, lack of judgment, and tendency toward negligence." Id. at ,210 N.W.2d at 64.
40. MINN. STAT. § 145.39, subd. 1 (197 1).
41. ld. § 145.39, subd. 2.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) adopts this standard in preference to
the older and more formalistic age classification system wherein a minor aged 7 to 14 was pre-
sumed incapable of negligence. Most courts are in agreement. PROSSER § 32, at 156. See
Eckhardt v. Hanson, 196 Minn. 270, 264 N.W. 776 (1936); Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 135
1974]
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ard, and there appears to be no valid reason for assuming that Rieken did not
have the legal capacity for negligent conduct.
That Randy Rieken's conduct constituted an actual cause of Stephen
Zerby's death seems equally apparent. Rieken bought the glue and gave it to
Steven Zerby for the express purpose of inhaling its fumes to become
intoxicated. :' Zerby did so, suffered nervous system damage, and drowned.
The rule pioneered by the Minnesota Supreme Court," and emulated else-
where,' 5 lays actual causation of the event at the feet of him whose conduct is
a substantial factor in bringing it about. Rieken's conduct in the progression
of events ending in Zerby's death was a sine qua non of the final result: had
Zerby not sniffed the glue, he would not have suffered injury to his central
nervous system and drowned, and had Rieken not purchased the glue and
given it to Zerby, he could not have sniffed it. Thus, the substantiality of
Rieken's conduct is apparent, and, although the causality of Warren's sale be
conceded, Rieken, too, "caused" Steven Zerby's death.
Whether the supreme court reached these conclusions concerning duty,
negligence per se, and actual cause is a mystery. Without explanation, the
court concluded that Rieken's conduct was not "a direct concurrent or
superseding cause of decedent's death ,' 7 but instead, "was merely a reaction
to the original wrongful act of [Warren] and therefore not a proximate
cause." 4 As the court thus deems proximate or legal cause the decisive factor
in denying contribution, it is necessary to define the Minnesota test of legal
cause and analyze the Zerb"v court's "original act-reaction" formulation in
light of the authorities on concurrent and intervening causation. 9
In legal cause the law has created a chimeric monster of multiple identi-
ties. A variety of "tests" are applied by various courts and writers,-" but in its
A.2d 395 (1957).
43. - Minn. at-.210 N.W.2d at 61.
44. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920).
45. E.g.. Dunham v. Village of Canisteo. 303 N.Y. 498, 104 N.E.2d 872 (1952): Carney v.
Goodman. 38 Tenn. App. 55. 270 S.W.2d 572 (1954): Walton v. Blauert, 256 Wis. 125,
40 N.W.2d 545 (1949). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431. 433 (1965).
46. The actor will not be relieved of liability merely because his causation coincides with that
of a third party to contribute to the same injury. Olson v. Buskey, 220 Minn. 155. 19 N.W.2d 57
(1945): Nees v. Minneapolis St. Ry.. 218 Minn. 532, 16 N.W.2d 758 (1944).
47. __Minn. at_ , 210 NW.2d at 63.
48. Id. at __.210 N.W.2d at 64.
49. See PROSSER §§ 41, 44: RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430, 432, 433. 441. 442.
468. See also authorities cited note 50 infra.
50. Purcell v. St. Paul City Rv., 48 Minn. 134. 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). See. e.g., Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R.. 248 N.Y. 339. 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (limits legal causation to a question of
duty and whether the plaintiff is within defendant's range of duty): Overseas Tankship (U.K.)
Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r Co.. [1961) A.C. 388 (Wagon Mound #1) (associates proximate
causation with the limits of foreseeability). This latter view is expressly rejected. however, in the
Minnesota case of DellNo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961). The "substantial
factor" formula was adopted in Minnesota as a legal cause test in Anderson v. Minneapolis. St.
P. & S. Ste. M. Ry.. 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920). but later specifically rejected vis-t-vis
(Vol. I
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broad sense proximate cause is a plethora of loosely related problems of
causation in fact, apportionment of negligence, foreseeability and unforeseen
consequences, intervening causes, shifting duties, and policy determinations.5
The policy component of legal causation appears to have been controlling in
Zerby, and as a result, the outcome bears little relationship to any of the
applicable legal "tests." To some extent this blending of law and policy
is unavoidable and even desirable. Application of any "test" necessarily de-
pends on the facts of the particular case, and "upon mixed considerations of
logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent."52 Nevertheless, by failing
to focus on policy qua policy, but, instead, adopting without explanation or
discussion the new "action-reaction" test, the Zerby court merely added to
the confusion surrounding legal causation.
The court endorses use of the test "consistently adhered to in Minne-
sota,1 53 the so-called direct consequences or unbroken sequence test of
proximate causation articulated in Christianson v. St. Paul, M. & 0. Ry.54
A literal application of that test, however, would compel the conclusion that
Rieken's conduct was a legal as well as an actual cause of Zerby's death. The
"unbroken sequence" test, fraught with many difficulties, 5 is composed of
two elements: first, it must be determined whether some injury was fore-
seeable by a reasonable person in the actor's position- second, the events in
the "unbroken sequence" must be defined to limit the actor's liability.5t Thus,
it is necessary to determine whether a reasonable teenager in Randy Rieken's
position could have foreseen that some injury would result if he gave his friend
a toxic glue to inhale, and whether the injury that did in fact result followed
in unbroken sequence from Rieken's conduct.
Certainly, the reasonable person, dimly aware of the hazards of abuse of
chemical substances, will avoid sniffing glue or giving glue to another to
proximate cause by Seward v. Minneapolis St. Ry. 222 Minn. 454, 25 N.W.2d 221 (1946): see
RESTATEMFNT (SECOND) OF TORTS , 431,433 (1965).
51. PROSSIER§42, at 249-50.
52. I T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS 01 LEGAi. LIABII ITY 110 (1906).
53. -- Minn. at-, 210 N.W.2d at 60 (quoting from the trial court opinion).
54. 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896).
[T]he law is that if the act is one which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care,
to have anticipated was liable to result in injury to others, then he is liable for any injury
proximately resulting from it, although he could not have anticipated the particular
injury which did happen. Consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an
intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural and proximate:
and for such consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though he could
not have foreseen the particular results which did follow. Id. at 97, 69 N.W. at 641.
55 The terms "unbroken sequence." "natural," and "efficient" are, it is submitted, as defiant
ofl definition as "proximate cause." Further, use of this test often leads to ridiculous conclusions.
E.g., In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co. [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.): see Goodhart, The Un-
.firseeahlc (onequences of a Negligent Act. 39 YAi LJ. 449 (1930). It will be observed that
the (hristianson test is also unduly chronological in that it tends to lead to liability of the first
actor. regardless ol degree of negligence: insofar as this is true, it ignores concurrence of separate
negligent acts.
56. See language quoted note 54 supra.
7
et al.: Torts: Contribution and Indemnity in Cases of Absolute Statutory
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1974
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
sniff. Common knowledge, gleaned from tragic experience of the past, puts
even the reasonable 13-year-old on notice of the danger of toxic glue. Further,
the only possible intervention between Rieken's negligence and Zerby's death
was Zerby's own volition: since the court specifically rejected a finding of
contributory negligence,57 the direct consequences test appears to have been
met.
Nevertheless, the Zerby court found, for two reasons, that Rieken's action
was not a proximate cause of Zerby's death. First, the court assessed Rie-
ken's actions not independently, but in the shadow of Warren's, focusing on
"action-reaction" and intervening cause. Second, and more important, the
court was loath to subvert the legislative policy enunciated in the glue sale-
abuse statute by allowing the seller to shift part of his burden to one whom
the statute was designed to protect. Each of these reasons deserves separate
consideration.
A. The "Action-Reaction" Test of Causation
In characterizing Warren's sale of glue to Rieken as "the original wrongful
act," and Rieken's conduct as mere "reaction" thereto, the court not only
creates a new and undefined standard of legal causation, it also begs the ques-
tion. Nothing in the court's decision or the briefs of the parties indicates that
Rieken was anything but a "normal" and "reasonable" child of 13, possessed
of his faculties and capable of making decisions. Granting, then, that Warren's
sale was wrongful, it does not automatically follow that Rieken's conduct
was mere "reaction." Though the court does not define the term, it connotes
a mere predetermined "knee jerk" response to a stimulus. The free will and
independence of a human being should be entitled to greater regard.
Possibly Rieken's membership in that class of people defined by the
Legislature5 ' as unable to protect themselves-'  precludes his actions from
being anything more than reaction. That categorization is made in cases like
Dart v. Pure Oil Co.," however, for purposes of defining a duty toward the
minor, not for judging the minor's duty toward another."' Further, that con-
clusion would have the grave result of prohibiting any liability for contribu-
tion by those in other similar "protected" classes. Because laws have been
passed prohibiting the sale of guns to minors, can one assume that a minor
successfully buying a gun is relieved of liability ab initio?"2 And because there
are statutes for the protection of inebriates, the violation of which creates
absolute liability, ": is the drunk free of the onerous consequences of his
57. __ Minn. at__, 210 N.W.2d at 62-63.
58. Id. at__, 210 N.W.2dat61.
59. Id. at __, 210 N.W.2d at 62.
60. 223 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555 (1947).
61. Id. at 535-36, 27 N.W.2d at 560.
62. (. Zerhy v. Warren, - Minn.__ , 210 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1973).
63. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Village of Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246, 143 N.W.2d 230 (1966).
[Vol. I
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binges? 4 What of the 18-year-old, "protected" by the glue-abuse statutes who
wants to set up a market for his illicit drug trade and so buys and gives an
8-year-old a pint of glue with instruction on its abuse and a promise of "more
where that came from"? Can it be posited that this "pusher" should be free
of liability just because the Legislature has endeavored to protect him? This is
the logical extension of the court's labeling of acts by protected minors as
"reaction," and thus summarily dismissing any possibility of wrongdoing by
the minor.
The conclusory and pre-dispositive legal effect of the undefined term
"reaction" is perhaps a more fundamental objection to the "action-reaction"
test than is its tendency to beg the relevant factual questions. Liability is de-
termined by merely labeling the sale as "original" and then applying the
Christianson formula: "Consequences which follow in unbroken sequence...
from the original negligent act are natural and proximate; and for such conse-
quences the original wrongdoer is responsible . "5 This formula seems to
place an inordinate emphasis. on the relative times of negligent actions, im-
posing liability upon the one who acts first, unless one realizes that in Chris-
tianson there was no question of concurring negligence, but rather a single
negligent act."
The Zerby court might have applied the test twice, once to each defendant,
but instead, it assessed the conduct of both in a single application, yielding
inevitable results. Relying upon Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry.,67 the court con-
cluded that Rieken's conduct did not constitute an "intervening" cause,6" be-
cause it "was not independent of the original wrongful sale."69 Though the
court quotes language from Purcell which seems on its face to be equally ap-
plicable to Zerby,7 ° the two cases are clearly distinguishable, both on the law
and on the facts. The plaintiff in Purcell suffered a miscarriage when the street-
car in which she was a passenger nearly collided with another streetcar.7 ' The
intervening force claimed by the defendant streetcar company to relieve it of
all liability for plaintiff's injury was her own "condition of mind" caused by
her physical condition.7 2 In Purcell, an intervening cause was claimed to su-
percede the original cause and to relieve the defendant of all liability, while in
64. See PROSSER § 32 at 154.
65. 67 Minn. at 97, 69 N.W. at 641.
66. Id. at 94-95, 69 N.W. at 640.
67. 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034(1892).
68. - Minn. at - , 210 N.W.2d at 63.
69. Id.
70. There may be a succession of intermediate causes, each produced by the one pre-
ceding, and producing the one following it. It must appear that the injury was the
natural consequence of the wrongful act or omission. The new, independent, inter-
vening cause must be one not produced by the wrongful act or omission, but inde-
pendent of it, and adequate to bring about the injurious result. Id.
71. 48 Minn. at 134-35, 50 N.W. at 1034.
72. "The defendant suggested that plaintiff's pregnancy rendered her more susceptible to
groundless alarm, and accounts more naturally and fairly than defendant's negligence for the
injurious consequences." Id. at 139, 50 N.W. at 1035.
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Zerby, Warren admitted his own causal fault and merely asked that damages
be apportioned. In Purcell, the force was a "condition of mind," fear, to
which no negligence was assigned, while in Zerby the force was the causal
negligence of a third person. Purcell held that plaintiff's fear was not an
"independent, intervening cause," but was "produced by the wrongful act."
It can hardly be said that causing the fear which in turn causes plaintiff's
injuries is logically or legally equivalent to giving a negligent third party the
means by which to effectuate his breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff.
Intervening cause was simply not at issue in Zerby. The focal point of an
intervention question is not causation, but "the defendant's original obliga-
tion" to recognize risk to the plaintiff and prevent harm from ensuing.73 An
intervening cause is one that comes into active operation after the original
negligent act, and ordinarily, if it was reasonably foreseeable at the time of
the original act, the actor will be held liable for the result.
74
Intervention is irrelevant to Warren's claim for contribution. He conceded
his own legal causation,7 5 his own "original obligation," and claimed that
Rieken's conduct was a concurrent cause, not a superseding one. 7 Unlike in-
tervention, where a defendant questions only his "original obligation," the
focus of concurrence must rest on two separate acts of negligence.77 Thus,
instead of examining the facts for intervention, the court might have searched
Rieken's actions for concurrence. Such a search would have proved fruitful,
as Rieken, like Warren, actually 78 and legally79 caused Zerby's death. It fol-
lows that both Warren and Rieken should have been held liable, as "it has
always been the law of this state that parties whose negligence concurs to
cause an injury are jointly and severally liable although not acting in
concert."'
B. The Role of Public Policy
The second reason given by the Minnesota court for its failure to grant con-
tribution in Zerby was its fear that in so doing, it would defeat the "legislative
purpose" of the glue sales-abuse statute.8 Thus, although Rieken's conduct
was apparently a proximate cause of Zerby's death, the court, grappling with
the policy aspects of legal causation, concluded that one who has been held
73. PROSSER § 44 at 270.
74. See Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d 164 (1964); Davidson v. Otter Tail
Power Co., 150 Minn. 446, 185 N.W. 644 (1921).
75. Brief for Appellant at 30-32, Zerby v. Warren, Minn. __ 210 N.W.2d 58(1973).
76. Id.
77. 1 T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE § 122 (rev. ed. 1941). See notes 28 to 31
supra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 43 to 46 supra and accompanying text.
79. See notes 50 to 57 supra and accompanying text.
80. Mathews v. Mills, 288 Minn. 16, 21-22, 178 N.W.2d 841,844 (1970).
81. -_ Minn. at - , 210 N.W.2d at 61.
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absolutely liable because of his statutory violation should not be allowed to
recover contribution from one who, though he is also a violator of the statute,
was intended to come within the scope of the statute's protection.
The more general issue, whether contribution is available to one whose tort
liability is not based upon ordinary negligence, is a familiar one. The pre-
cedents range from denying contribution in all cases to granting it to all but
the most willful tortfeasors. Although there were certainly contribution cases
before it, the 1799 decision of Merryweather v. Nixans2 first disallowed con-
tribution among intentional joint tortfeasors. Initially, courts followed
Merryweather, not deigning to give relief to one guilty of an intentional
wrong, u but allowed contribution to merely negligent primary defendants."
Gradually, and particularly after adoption of permissive rules of joinder, the
majority of courts permitted apportionment among all multiple tortfeasors.,
Since Ankeny v. Moffett," the Minnesota court has followed the minority
rule, denying contribution "where the person seeking contribution was guilty
of an intentional wrong, or, at least, where he must be presumed to have
known that he was doing an illegal act. ' '8 7 In two more recent cases, the
court has reaffirmed the Ankeny principle, holding that contribution was to
be allowed unless the traffic law violations of the primary defendants were
found to be willful and committed with recognition of the peril involved."
The decision in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Village of Hewitt'9 collects
the Minnesota cases in point and also contains some important dicta relevant
to the contribution issue in Zerby. In that case, bars owned by the villages of
Hewitt and Long Prairie violated the Civil Damage Act by serving liquor to
one Wallace while he was obviously intoxicated. 0 He then negligently caused
an automobile accident. Before trial, appellant, Wallace's insurer, paid
82. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). For an historical analysis, see Leflar, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932); Note, Contribution and Indem-
nity in California, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 490 (1969).
83. Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131 (N.Y. 1816) (dictum).
84. Bailery v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (1859); Archeson v. Miller, 2 Ohio St. 203 (1853)
(dictum).
85. Gulf & S.I.R.R. v. Gulf Ref. Co., 260 F. 262 (S.D. Miss. 1919); Forsythe v. Los Angeles
Ry., 149 Cal. 569, 87 P. 24 (1906); Central Ry. v. Swift & Co., 23 Ga. App. 346, 98 S.E. 256
(1919); City of Louisville v. Louisville Ry., 156 Ky. 141, 160 S.W. 771 (1913); Cain v. Quannah
Light & Ice Co., 131 Okla. 25, 267 P. 641 (1928). See Leflar, supra note 82, at 136, 141. There
were many exceptions to the rule; one important exception freed from liability defendants whose
complicity was based on respondeat superior. This is relevant here, as it was Warren's clerk, not
Warren, himself, who sold the glue.
86. 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887). In Ankeny, the plaintiff was injured when the walls of
a building fell on him. The court allowed contribution from one negligent co-owner defendant to
the other.
87. 37 Minn. at 110, 33 N.W. at 320.
88. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Danberry, 234 Minn. 391,48 N.W.2d 567 (1951); Kemerer v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 201 Minn. 239, 276 N.W. 228 (1937).
89. 274 Minn. 246, 143 N.W.2d 230 (1966).
90. See MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1971).
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19,000 dollars to plaintiff, while the villages settled for a substantially smaller
sum. Appellant's action for contribution was met by summary judgment in
favor of respondent villages for failure to state a claim on which relief could
be granted. The Civil Damage Act does not give the inebriate a cause of
action for his own injuries, but allows any third party injured by him to re-
cover from the violating liquor vendor.9' The novel issue presented in Hewitt,
then, was whether the inebriate or his subrogee might recover contribution
from the vendor who illegally sold the liquor.
The Hewitt court held first that, "the parties having a common liability to
the injured persons, it is no bar to contribution that their liability rests on
different grounds,"9 and second, that driving while intoxicated is not, of it-
self, sufficient to show willfulness.93 Citing the cases discussed above, the
court held that only if Wallace's operation of his car constituted willful mis-
conduct would he or his insurer be denied contribution.
94
Although in neither Hewitt nor Zerby was there a showing of willful or in-
tentional misconduct by the primary defendant, and although violation of
the statutes involved in both cases gives rise to absolute liability, 5 the two
cases may be distinguishable. In Zerby, an unprotected party, who had
violated the statute and was held liable in damages to a third party, sought
contribution from a party protected by the statute. In Hewitt, on the other
hand, one of those protected, held liable in damages to a third party for his
common law negligence, sought contribution from unprotected violators of the
statute. Remaining unanswered is the question of whether the usual rules that only
willful misconduct, and not liability resting on different grounds, bars contri-
bution, will apply where a violator of an absolute liability statute seeks contri-
bution from a defendant who has been negligent under the common law test.
If contribution does lie in such a case, then surely the violator of an absolute
liability statute should also be entitled to contribution from another whose
violation of a similar statute also gives rise to absolute liability.
Though Hewitt offers no conclusive answer, analogous cases in Minnesota
and elsewhere seem to support the claim for contribution. At one point the
Hewitt court indicates that it makes little difference who sues whom when
two parties are liable to the same injured person; if the victim is entitled to
recover from each defendant, it follows that the defendants should be liable
for contribution to each other." Thus, if Rieken's violation of the statutory
91. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Williams, 265 Minn. 333, 121 N.W.2d 580 (1963);
Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 103 N.W.2d 131 (1960); Cavin v. Smith, 228
Minn. 322, 37 N.W.2d 368 (1949); Sworski v. Colman, 204 Minn. 474,283 N.W. 778 (1939).
92. 274 Minn. at 253, 143 N.W.2d at 235.
93. Id. at 258, 143 N.W.2d at 239.
94. Id. at 254-56, 143 N.W.2d at 236-37.
95. See Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526,27 N.W.2d 555 (1947).
96. Here it would seem that there is no question that the driver of the automobile and
the vendor making the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor are jointly liable to the
injured parties. It is true that liability rests on different legal grounds. One rests on
common-law negligence and the other on the Civil Damage Act. But the liability of
[Vol. I
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duty of care did constitute a proximate cause of Zerby's death, Rieken could
certainly have been sued and forced to bear full liability. 7 It would surely
allow a triumph of form over substance to deny the co-actor, Warren, for-
tuitously burdened with the direct liability, relief by means of contribution.
Some conflicting dicta in Hewitt notes, however, that, according to
Dart v. Pure Oil Co., certain statutory violations bar the defense of contribu-
tory negligence. Further, "[t]he rationale of the rules barring contributory
negligence and barring right of contribution against a wrongdoer is the same.
Both are based on the unwillingness of the courts to aid one who is guilty
of an intentional wrong. . . ."" It would apparently follow that, since the
violator of the Civil Damage Act is barred from a contributory negligence
defense, 00 he is also denied contribution. Since Warren violated a similar
statute, "prohibiting sale of dangerous articles to minors,"'' his contribu-
tion claim would be extinguished by the very first holding of the Zerby
court.102
An analysis of Dart, however, reveals the flaw in equating a bar to con-
tributory negligence with a bar to contribution. Contribution has been denied
where intentional tortfeasors were involved because courts believed that the
law should not stoop to aid them and thus risk encouraging them. The defense
of contributory negligence, on the other hand, is barred in the case of those
"exceptional" statute violations solely because the legislative purpose of
protecting persons adjudged incapable of exercising due care for their own
safety could not be fulfilled if the defense were recognized. 03 Thus, Warren's
inability to assert Zerby's contributory negligence as a defense should bear
little relationship to the issue of his separate contribution claim against
Rieken.
Cases allowing contribution to one held strictly liable support this dis-
tinction. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Skaja v. Andrews
Hotel Co.,' 4 allowed contribution between two violators of the Minnesota
Civil Damage Act. In that case, the liquor vendors illegally sold liquor to a
minor who shot and killed plaintiff's husband. Mere violation of a strict
liability statute, said the court, does not raise a presumption of willfulness,
both is common to the injured party. Action for recovery against one does not bar
action against the other .... If it is true that one full recovery sets the limit against
both tort feasors, the question naturally arises-why should they not each be liable for
their fair share inter se, whether they are sued in the same action or separately....
274 Minn. at 251, 143 N.W.2d at 234.
97. This is not to say that had Zerby sued Rieken directly without joining Warren the court's
decision and rationale would have been different.
98. 274 Minn. at 258, 143 N.W.2d at 238-39.
99. Id.
100. Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657 (1968).
101. __ Minn. at __, 210 N.W.2d at 62.
102. See id.
103. PROSSER § 65, at 426.
104. 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657 (1968).
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and absent a showing that the party seeking contribution "was conscious of
doing a wrong or committing a violation of statute," relief should be
granted.1"5 There are, however, obvious distinctions between Skaja and
Zerby. Not only does the latter involve contribution between two statute
violators, but also the policy considerations supporting contribution in the
Civil Damage Act case are absent in Zerby.'"1 Yet, the general rule of law
established in Skaja appears equally applicable to Zerby. Warren was not
"conscious of doing a wrong or committing a violation of statute."'0 7 More-
over, the policy rationale are at least evenly divided in Zerby.
Dram shop and products liability decisions from other jurisdictions, which
have allowed contribution to one held strictly liable from one in a protected
class, lend further support for contribution in Zerby. In two recent Illinois
cases, I08 indemnity was granted to dram-shop owners held liable to injured
plaintiffs. In one case, the Illinois court said the "active" participant, the
drinker who assaulted the plaintiff, should indemnify the bar owner if the
latter was only "passively" negligent.0 9 In the other, the court held in more
general terms that the purposes of the Civil Damage Act would not be im-
paired if the minor drinker were required to indemnify the liquor vendor for
damages it paid to an injured third party." In a significant departure from
prior case law, the New York appellate division recently reversed the dis-
missal of a cross-claim brought by liquor vendors for contribution from the
vendee-defendant who injured the plaintiff."' The court announced "new
guidelines" to determine the right to contribution: "shared responsibility in
apportioning liability among parties involved together in causing damage by
negligence."' 12
On balance, the fact that the party from whom contribution is sought is a
member of the class protected by the statute violated by the contributee should
be legally irrelevant. Further, the source of liability, whether statutory or
common law negligence, should be equally irrelevant. So long as both parties
have contributed to an injury by their negligence they should be liable inter se.
The dram shop cases seem to be on all fours with Zerby. A statute creates
105. Id. at 421, 161 N.W.2d at 660.
106. The Skaja court makes it clear that the paramount purpose of the Civil Damage Act,
social insurance through liability of the one who profits by sales, weighs heavily in its decision.
Id. at 422, 161 N.W.2d at 661. Since Rieken is obviously not a co-seller, the Skaja policy
rationales are probably inapplicable.
107. Id. at 421, 161 N.W.2d at 660.
108. Walker v. Service Liquor Store, 120 Ill. App. 2d 112,255 N.E.2d 613 (1970); Geocaris v.
Bangs, 91 Ill. App. 2d 81, 234 N.E.2d 17 (1968) (overturning the rule of Coffey v. ABC
Liquor Stores, Inc., 13 I11. App. 2d 510, 142 N.E.2d 705 (1957)).
109. Walker v. Service Liquor Store, 120 I1. App. 2d 112, 255 N.W.2d 613 (1970). One
might well question the wisdom of allowing indemnity to nullify the dram shop owner's
statutory liability. Further, the active-passive rationale is irrelevant in Minnesota.
110. Geocaris v. Bangs, 91 111. App. 2d 81, 234 N.E.2d 17 (1968).
111. Wood v. City of New York, 39 App. Div. 2d 534, 330 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1972).
112. Id. at 534, 330 N.Y.S.2d at924.
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liability for the contributee where none existed before; the contributee by
illegal sale raises "strict liability;" the contributor as a direct result of his pur-
chase injures a third party; and for that injury both vendor and purchaser are
liable in damages.
Identical elements are present in two recent products liability cases.,"
Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co." 4 presented the issue of whether a manu-
facturer held strictly liable for damages resulting from sale of a defective
machine could receive contribution from the purchaser of the product who
negligently set it up for use by his employees. In the wrongful-death action
brought by the employee's spouse the court held that Pennsylvania law would
permit contribution from the negligent employer-purchaser regardless of the
separate sources of liability, provided the parties were inpari delicto"I
Noting that strict liability was adopted to afford maximum protection of
the consumer who is unable to protect himself,"6 and to enforce the seller's
implied assurance of the safety of his product, 7 another federal court,
applying Pennsylvania law, reached a similar conclusion."' It permitted con-
tribution in favor of a strictly liable manufacturer of a defective product
against a third party whose negligence contributed to plaintiff's injury on the
theory that the tortfeasor should not be permitted to take advantage of the
protection designed for the user or consumer of the product"' and held that
only intentional wrongdoers should be denied contribution. 2
Assuming that Rieken tortiously caused Zerby's injury, giving rise to com-
mon liability, no policy reason appears to require the denial of contribution
in Zerby v. Warren. The Minnesota cases,' all stand for the principle that
113. Chamberlain v. Carborundum Co., 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973); Walters v. Hiab
Hydraulics, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1000 (M.D. Pa. 1973). But see Fenton v. McCrory Corp., 47
F.R.D. 260 (W.D. Pa. 1969), noted in 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 749 (1971).
114. 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973).
115. Id. at 34.
116. Walters v. Hiab Hydraulics, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1000, 1003 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1002. The Walters court held in accordance with § 1(c) of the 1955 Revised Uniform
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act that only intentional (willful and wanton)
tortfeasors should be denied contribution. The court, noting that the underlying policy of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) is not defeated by contribution, went on to
say that contribution was allowable before the strict liability of § 402A and nothing in that
section would seem to abandon it.
120. 356 F. Supp. at 1002.
121. Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 161 N.W.2d 657 (1968); Farmers Ins.
Exch. v. Hewitt, 274 Minn. 246, 143 N.W.2d 230 (1966); Gustafson v. Johnson, 235 Minn.
358, 51 N.W.2d 108 (1952); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Danberry, 234 Minn. 391, 48 N.W.2d
567 (1951); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. 120, 5 N.W.2d 397 (1942);
Kemerer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 201 Minn. 239, 276 N.W. 228 (1937); Hardware
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Anderson, 191 Minn. 158, 253 N.W. 374 (1934); Duluth M. & N. Ry. v. Mc-
Carthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N.W. 766 (1931); Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Christenson, 183
Minn. 182,236 N.W. 618 (1931); Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109,33 N.W. 320 (1887).
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contribution is allowed unless the primary defendant's conduct is willful or
wanton. Moreover, were their positions reversed, Rieken would surely have
been entitled to recover contribution from Warren."'
Negligent purchasers who cause injuries to others are not protected by
strict products liability, though the injured third parties certainly are. Not
drinkers but their victims, whether they are survivors of or parties injured by
the drinker, are protected by the statutory liability of the Civil Damage Act.
Similarly, not negligent, supplying minors, but injured minors should be pro-
tected by the glue sale-abuse statute. Review of Dart v. Pure Oil Co., the
leading case in Minnesota on "exceptional statutes" raising strict liability,
reveals the sole purpose of such liability is protection of a member of a lim-
ited class from his own inability to protect himself."' It is difficult to imagine
how the injured party might be better protected by disallowing contribution
to the strictly liable defendant. The plaintiff will receive compensation in
either event and, in fact, may be assured of a more complete recovery if a
greater number of defendants is involved. Moreover, why should a negligent
party be excused from liability just because he has acted concurrently with a
statute violator?
2 4
In its effort to further the purpose of the glue sales-abuse statute the court
seems to have forgotten about the glue-possession-abuse statute. 25 It, too,
was intended to protect minors from glue abuse.' 2 The Zerby decision un-
dermines the viability of this possession statute. One who sells glue to the
minor reaps absolute civil liability, while one who merely gives glue to the
minor, if he is himself a minor, goes free.
The central issue pleaded by Warren and ignored by the Zerby decision,
and from which all of the results herein reviewed stem, is the concurring
causal fault of Rieken in buying, possessing, and giving the glue to Zerby.
Once recognized, Rieken's liability forcefully impels investigation of legal
122. See notes 96 & 97 supra and accompanying text.
123. 223 Minn. at 535, 27 N.W.2d at 560.
124. More general policy arguments against contribution might be posited: a) because of the
moral obloquy of his actions Warren should bear the full financial consequences of his
negligence instead of a mere fine, b) requiring Warren to bear the loss will deter future similar
illegal sales, c) Warren has the "deepest pocket" and the means to spread the loss, and d)
because Rieken is one of those in the class protected by MINN. STAT. § 145.38 (1971), it would be
incongruous to make him pay for a breach of duty owed to him.
However, the legislative purpose, protection of minors, is effected by the only means it has
specifically endorsed, criminal penalty. It is beyond the power of a civil court to create penalties;
restitution, and not punishment, is the function of the court. Second, deterrence is achieved by the
statute and its enforcement by the proper officials. Warren's liability for even part of the damage
would achieve the same result as denial of contribution. Next, Warren's "deep pocket" is
questionable, and, as the next section shows, the court has specifically denied his right to
"spread" his loss by insurance. Fourth, Rieken's liability would pay not for the breach of duty
toward him, but for his breach toward Zerby.
125. MINN. STAT. § 145.39 (1971).
126. Zerbyv. Warren.__ Minn. ... 210 N.W.2d 58, 61 (1973).
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causation, concurrence, and the policy basis of the contribution action. With-
out such analysis one must search in vain for the implications of Zerby.
III. REFUSAL To ENFORCE THE CONTRACT OF INDEMNITY
Not only did the Minnesota court impose absolute liability upon defendant
Warren, refusing to grant him contribution from another whose fault had
concurred with Warren's to cause the plaintiff's injury, it also denied Warren
the right to spread the loss resulting from this absolute liability through in-
surance. United States Plywood, manufacturer of Weldwood glue, expressly
agreed to "protect, defend, hold harmless and indemnify" the retailer "from
and against any, and all liability, cost and expense arising from the death or
injuries to any persons" resulting from "the handling, display, sale, and use,
consumption or distribution" of its glue. 27 It also agreed to secure, and did in
fact secure, insurance against such damages.12 The trial court construed the
contract to apply only to legal sales, thereby nullifying it for purposes of the
case at hand.
On appeal, Warren argued that the indemnity provision was clear on its
face, and as, "it is only where ambiguity exists that courts are required to
resort to construction," 21 indemnity should be allowed. Further, Warren
noted that indemnity is usually allowed in Minnesota "where there is an ex-
press contract between the parties containing an explicit undertaking to re-
imburse for liability of the character involved."'2 3 He claimed that the con-
tract should be enforced where the commission of the tort has been only an
"undesired possibility" and was not part of the contract's consideration. 3'
Appellee, United States Plywood, claimed that the second sentence of the
indemnity provision was modified by the first, so that only damages caused
by unmerchantable or defective glue should raise its liability. 32 Further, it
127. The contract on the Coast-to-Coast order form, signed by United States Plywood, reads
in relevant part:
Seller hereby expressly warrants that the merchandise is merchantable as defined in
the UCC Section 2-314 (2) and free from latent defects and that such warranties shall
run to Buyer's customers and to customers of Buyer's customers. Seller agrees to pro-
tect, defend, hold harmless and indemnify Buyer and its customers from and against any,
and all liability, cost and expenses arising from death or injuries to any persons or
person or damage to property alleged to have resulted from the handling, display, sale
and use, consumption or distribution of Seller's products .... Brief for Appellant at
A-85, Zerby v. Warren, - Minn.- 210 N.W.2d 58 (1973).
128. Id. at 7.
129. Id. at 8.
130. Id. at 40. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 572 (1932) reads: "A bargain to indemnify
another against the consequences of committing a tortious act is illegal unless the performance of
the tortious act is only an undesired possibility in the performance of the bargain, and the bar-
gain does not tend to induce the act." See also Independent School Dist. No. 877 v. Loberg
Plumbing & Heating Co., 266 Minn. 426, 123 N.W.2d 793 (1963); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Thorn-
ton Bros., 206 Minn. 193, 288 N.W. 226 (1939).
132. Brief for Respondent, United States Plywood, at 7-9, Zerby v. Warren,
Minn. __, 210 N.W.2d 58 (1973).
1974]
17
et al.: Torts: Contribution and Indemnity in Cases of Absolute Statutory
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1974
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
argued that indemnity would be inequitable since it had no control over the
sale.
3 1
In light of the strong arguments and wealth of authority on both sides of
this question, the court's summary disposition of indemnity is disconcerting.
The court relied on the dicta in three Minnesota cases, each of which held an
indemnity provision valid, 34 to say that "if the contract relieves a person
from negligence in the discharge of an absolute duty imposed by law for the
protection of others, it is void.'
3
Because of the court's exclusive dependence upon public policy, it is fruitless
to review in detail the authorities enforcing and refusing to enforce contracts
of indemnity.'1 Public policy, more than any other legal doctrine, depends on
the particular facts of the case. Suffice it to say that both Professor Wil-
liston'37 and the Restatement,'m adopt the rule that the appropriate inquiry is
whether the contract will induce or promote the tortious act. If part of the
consideration of the contract is the commission of a tort, then it is certainly
unenforceable. 39 If the tort is willful and intentional the courts will often
imply either that the indemnity induced it, or that, at least, existence of the
indemnity contract, by eliminating financial liability, reduced the tortfeasor's
compunction and forbearance. On the other hand, if the tort is only an
133. Id. at 9.
134. Speltz Grain & Coal Co. v. Rush, 236 Minn. 1, 51 N.W.2d 641 (1952); Pettit Grain &
Potato Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 227 Minn. 225, 35 N.W.2d 127 (1948); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
Thornton Bros., 206 Minn. 193, 288 N.W. 226 (1939). In Pettit, for example, the plaintiff was
granted the validity of its contractual indemnity though it relieved it of the financial conse-
quences of its own statutory duty, when plaintiff's train emitted sparks and caused a fire.
135. __ Minn. at __ , 210 N.W.2d at 64.
136. E.g., Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 313 F.2d 467 (6th Cir. 1963);
Grady v. Herrick, 288 Mass. 304, 192 N.E. 748 (1934); Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Patterson-
Emerson-Comstock, 404 Pa. 53, 171 A.2d 185 (1961); Griffiths v. Broderick, Inc., 27 Wash.
2d 901, 182 P.2d 18 (1947). See authorities collected supra note 130, cases cited supra note 134.
With respect to such contractual indemnity, Professor Williston states:
There is no reason for denying a contract operation according to its terms, unless its
tendency is to provide immunity for future conduct that is tortious or opposed to public
policy. And if future tortious conduct does not involve serious moral obliquity and
there is no reason to suppose that the contract will induce such conduct, a contract for
freedom from liability for it is not invalid. 15 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1750 (3d
ed. W. Jaeger 1972).
He continues, "An attempted exemption from liability for a future intentional tort or for a
future willful act or one of gross negligence is void." Id. at § 1750A.
The general rule has been summarized as follows:
It is now the prevailing rule that a contract may validly provide for the indemnifica-
tion of one against, or relieve him from liability for, his own future acts of negligence
[citing Thornton, among other authorities].... Some courts have reached this result
on the basis of an analogy between such contracts and insurance policies, while others
reach the same result independently, as by simply stating that such contracts do not
violate public policy. However, such contracts are invalid if it can be shown that they
tend to promote a breach of duty to the public. 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indemnity § 9 (1969).
137. 15 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1750, 1750A (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1972).
138. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 572 (1932); see note 130 supra.
139. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 572 (1932).
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undesired possibility, and not induced by the contract, indemnity is usually
enforced. 4 ' As in the decisions where indemnity agreements have been en-
forced, there is nothing in Zerby to indicate that the contract induced the
intentional infliction of injury upon another. That the sale of the glue itself
was an intentional act is insufficient to support the conclusion that the en-
forcement of the contract would be contrary to public policy. In a rather ex-
treme case, 1' for example, the Georgia Supreme Court held an insurer to the
terms of its policy when the insured incurred liability by willfully racing his
automobile on the highway. The court was careful to distinguish between
intentional misconduct, of which the insured was surely guilty, and the in-
tentional infliction of injuries, in which he had no part.' Only the latter is
uninsurable, as the Massachusetts court 43 has recently agreed.
More in point here are three cases in which the insurer of a vendor of a
dangerous product was required to indemnify the vendor despite the fact that
all of the sales in question were negligent and two of them were actually
illegal. A pharmacist in Atkins v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.'" paid
for broad liability coverage similar to Warren's: "[t]o pay on behalf of the
insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay be-
cause of bodily injury, sickness or disease including death at any time
resulting therefrom, sustained by any person and caused by accident."'45 The
pharmacist, in violation of a statute, sold amobarbital pills to a customer.
When the customer brought an action for damages arising out of his conse-
quent addiction and resulting mental and physical injuries, the insurer balked.
Although enforcement of the insurance policy would "relieve a person from
[the financial consequences of] negligence in the discharge of an absolute duty
imposed by law for the protection of others," 46 the court granted the pharm-
acist summary judgment.'47
In a similar situation another Michigan decision 4 ' enforced a liability in-
surance policy covering accidents arising out of business operations. The
insured sold what he claimed to be a butane or liquid petroleum heater but
that was, in reality, suited only for natural gas. When connected by the pur-
chaser to a butane supply, the heater asphyxiated two persons. The insurance
company refused to defend the suit on the grounds of a "products liability-
completed operations" exclusion." 9 In Brant, however, the court held that
140. Seenotes 130 & 136 supra.
141. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Hood, 110 Ga. App. 855, 140 S.E.2d 68 (1964).
142. Id. at 857, 140 S.E.2d at 70.
143. Sheehan v. Goriansky, 321 Mass. 200, 72 N.E.2d 538 (1947).
144. 7 Mich. App. 414, 151 N.W.2d 846 (1967).
145. Id. at 416, 151 N.W.2d at 847.
146. Zerby v. Warren, - Minn.______ 210 N.W.2d 58, 64 (1973).
147. 7 Mich. App. at 420, 151 N.W.2d at 849.
148. Brant v. Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 4 Mich. App. 596, 603, 145 N.W.2d 410, 414
(1966).
149. Id. at 598, 145 N.W.2d at 412.
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there were really two "accidents," one, the wrongful sale, and the other, the
installation. 5 0 Therefore, the policy required the company's defense of the
action against the insured.'
More closely analogous to Zerby is the recent Illinois case of Cobbins v.
General Accident Fire & Life Insurance Corp. 52 An insured store owner sold
fireworks to the I -year-old plaintiff in violation of a statute prohibiting sales
to children under 12. The plaintiffs shirt caught fire after he ignited the fire-
works, and he suffered permanent injuries from the resulting burns. Plaintiff
brought a declaratory judgment action to force the insurance company to de-
fend the suit and pay any damages. Again, the insurer was forced to indem-
nify, notwithstanding an exclusion similar to the one in Brant.1
53
In each of the three cases discussed, and in Zerby v. Warren, a retailer
contracted for indemnity. The retailers then negligently, and in all cases but
Brant, illegally, sold products which, because of their negligence, brought
injury. The retailers sought enforcement of their indemnity contracts. None
of the injuries was said to be intentionally, willfully, or wantonly inflicted,
though doubtless the sales, themselves, were intentional. In none of the cases
was it claimed that the insurance contract induced the illegal sale, and so was
against public policy. Yet, in Zerby, the Minnesota Supreme Court, unlike
the three other courts, concluded that a contract of indemnity relieving "a
person of negligence in the discharge of an absolute duty imposed by law for
the protection of others" is void.
54
Neither in the three cases from foreign jurisdictions nor in Zerby v. Warren,
is public policy of contractual indemnity discussed. One is, therefore, left at a
loss to explain when such contracts will be enforced and what public policy
150. 4 Mich. App. at 603, 145 N.W.2d at 414. Note that the three cases reviewed here,
Atkins, Brant, and Cobbins hold contrary to a line of Minnesota insurance decisions with
analagous facts, in each of which insurer liability is denied. Hagen Supply Corp. v. Iowa Nat'l
Mut. Ins. Co., 331 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1964) (applying Minnesota law); Lyman Lumber & Coal
Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 494, 289 N.W. 40 (1939); Hutchinson Gas Co. v. Phoenix
Indem. Co., 206 Minn. 257, 288 N.W. 847 (1939); Hultquist v. Novak, 202 Minn. 352, 278
N.W. 524 (1938).
The Minnesota decisions would be determinative of the present case in favor of United States
Plywood but for the distinctions between the policies of insurance at issue in those cases and
the broad indemnity agreement here. Whereas, the above-cited cases construe specific insurance
policy exclusions, the United States Plywood agreement was expansive and free of exclusion.
See note 127 supra and accompanying text. It also must be noted that public policy, relied upon
so heavily in the Zerby decision, was not held to be a factor in the earlier Minnesota cases.
Atkins, Brant, and Hutchinson involved "products hazards" exclusions: Hultquist, Hagen, and
Lyman concerned "premises-operation" clauses. Other courts circumvent such exclusions, as
with the dual "accident" theory mentioned above; the Minnesota court interprets the same
clauses restrictively. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the cited cases to indicate that it does
so on the theory that insurance coverage would be contrary to public policy.
151. 4 Mich. App. at 603, 145 N.W.2d at 414.
152. 2 Ill. App. 3d 379, 279 N.E.2d 443 (1972).
153. Id. at 387, 279 N.E.2d at 443, 448.
154. __ Minn. at-, 210 N.W.2d at 64.
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implications should be considered. However, the general rule of Zerby pre-
cludes indemnity against the consequences of negligent violations of "an ab-
solute duty imposed by law for the protection of others,"'55 despite the fact
that "it is now the prevailing rule that a contract may validly provide for the
indemnification of one against, or relieve him of liability for, his own future
acts of negligence." ' s The only public policy consideration discussed in the
authorities cited"' is the possible inducement or promotion of a breach of
duty to the public. Since no other reason is given in Zerby, it may be assumed
that the court disallowed indemnification, and will in similar cases in the
future, to avoid inducement.
The weight of three arguments must be placed in the indemnity-inducement
balance. First, was Warren induced by his contract with United States Ply-
wood to make a negligent and illegal sale to Rieken? There is certainly no
evidence in the decision or the parties' briefs to so indicate. It seems fanciful
to imagine that Warren even considered insurance coverage when he sold
glue. 5 Second, there are substantial conceptual difficulties involved in in-
ducement of negligence generally. 59 Third, the enormous implications of dis-
allowance of indemnification against negligent violations of "absolute duties"
must be considered. Not only pharmacists and hardware store owners
attempt to protect themselves through contracts of indemnity. Motorists in-
sure themselves against consequences of their violations of traffic safety laws,
and tavern owners indemnify themselves against negligent and illegal sales of
liquor, often to "protected" minors.
Such insurance "relieves a person from negligence in the discharge of an
absolute duty imposed by law for the protection of others"'6 0 in much the
same way Warren's contract did. Yet, it helps spread loss, takes from the
"deep pocket," and assures plaintiffs of compensation. 6' Such public policy
considerations are entitled to substantial weight, though they were not men-
tioned in Zerby.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court's creation of an implied statutory tort lia-
blity so absolute as to preclude contribution or contractual indemnity as a
matter of law appears unprecedented. This is particularly troublesome in
light of the fact that the Zerby court did not indicate that it was faced with a
155. Id.
156. 41 AM. JUR. 2D indemnity § 9 (1969).
157. See authorities cited notes 130, 134 & 136 supra.
158. See - Minn. at - , 210 N.W.2d at 61. This statement is supported by the fact that
the actual sale was made by Warren's sales clerk.
159. Negligence, if it can be described as lack of due care under the circumstances, follows
upon the actor's failure to consider the various ramifications of his actions. Without prior
weighing of his actions and consequences, how can the negligent actor be induced to so act?
160. Zerby v. Warren,_ Minn.... - 210 N.W.2d 58,64(1973).
161. Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 422-23, 161 N.W.2d 657, 661 (1968).
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case of first impression or that it was making new law. On its face, the de-
csion appears to apply established law rather than to break new ground.
Thus, it is not the supreme court's answers, so much as its failure to ask
important questions which puzzles the reader of Zerby v. Warren. Did Randy
Rieken actually cause Zerby's death? Was his conduct negligent, or did his
age make negligence impossible? What legislative purpose justifies denial of
contribution? Is any minor giving toxic glue to another minor really to be
free of contribution liability as the court implies? What policy considerations
dictate denial of contractual indemnity for negligence?
The issues raised and left unanswered by Zerby reach far beyond the facts
of that particular case. The conclusory nature of both the court's legal formu-
lations and its public policy judgments give one little basis on which to predict
the outcome of similar cases in the future. The broader implications of the
law made here, the possible effects it might have upon other types of statutory
liability and upon the theoretical basis as well as the underwriting practices
of liability insurance, remain unknown and unknowable.
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